- Start from purpose: write down what each system type is for, and let that justify what runs on it rather than justifying removals one by one.
- Bake least functionality into provisioning — a hardened build image beats stripping machines after deployment, every time.
3.4.6 — Least functionality
3.4 Configuration Management · NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 · The heading label is this site's navigational shorthand; the official language is the statement below.
Employ the principle of least functionality by configuring organizational systems to provide only essential capabilities.
NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 — Protecting CUI in Nonfederal Systems ↗NIST SP 800-171A — Assessing Security Requirements for CUI ↗What this requirement is after
Systems run only what their job requires. Every service, feature, and application beyond the essential is attack surface you are defending for no operational reason — and in a small shop, nobody has time to defend the unnecessary.
Brilliant at the Basics practices that support this requirement
The campaign’s twenty practices are a priority list, not a control catalog, and none of them works this requirement’s substance directly. It still applies to you if it is in your contract’s scope: address it through your own implementation and the related artifacts below, and treat the absence of a mapping here as honesty, not permission to skip it.
Implementation considerations and evidence
- Build or hardening standards defining the essential capability set per system type
- A sampled system review comparing what runs against what the standard allows
Templates and worksheets with a mapped relationship
No artifact in the library names this requirement yet. The library index groups everything by category and practice.
Where this lands in Rev. 3
Sources and review status
| Primary sources | NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 — Protecting CUI in Nonfederal Systems · NIST SP 800-171A — Assessing Security Requirements for CUI |
|---|---|
| Review status | Pending NIST SME review |
| Content version | 1.0 |
| Updated |