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ATL-026INVENTORYEDITORIAL REVIEW COMPLETE

Remote Access Pathway Inventory

A complete, dated inventory of every way into the environment from outside — VPNs, RDP gateways, vendor tools, cloud portals — with authentication, brokering, logging, and time-bounding recorded per pathway, plus a kill list for the pathways nobody authorized.

Using this artifact

Purpose, inputs, and completion

Purpose. Remote access is how most environments are actually entered — by employees, by vendors, and by attackers using either's credentials. This inventory makes every pathway visible and comparable: who uses it, how it authenticates, what brokers it, where its sessions land in a log, and whether it is standing or summoned. The pathways that fail those questions become the work plan; the ones nobody authorized become the kill list.

When to use it. Build the first draft from exported configurations and vendor contracts, then interview the people who actually connect — the honest answer to 'how does the vendor get in when the line is down at midnight?' is the row this inventory exists to capture. Review quarterly: pathways breed, and every new tool, vendor, or provider brings one. The inventory feeds the vendor risk assessment (ATL-028), which cites its rows.

Required inputsHave these before you start
  • Firewall and VPN configurations, exported and read — not recalled
  • The vendor and support-contract list; every support contract is a candidate pathway
  • Interviews with maintenance and engineering: how do you get in from home, and how does the vendor get in?
Completion instructionsIn order
  • Enumerate from evidence first — firewall rules, VPN user lists, installed remote-support tools — then interview, because the pathway that hurts you is the one not in the configs.
  • For each pathway, record how it authenticates, what brokers it, where its sessions are logged, and whether it is standing or on-demand.
  • Anything discovered that nobody authorized goes on the kill list with an owner and a removal date — not into the inventory as if it belonged.
  • For OT pathways, replace standing vendor tunnels with brokered, time-bound, watched sessions, and coordinate the cutover with the vendor and process owner through a maintenance window.
Keeping it honest

Evidence, validation, and failure modes

Evidence this producesWhat a reviewer could examine
  • A complete, dated pathway inventory with authentication and logging recorded per pathway
  • A kill-list record of unauthorized pathways found and closed
  • Review dates showing the inventory is maintained rather than archaeological
Validation checksRun these before calling it complete
  • Compare the VPN's active user list against the inventory's who-uses-it entries; accounts with no matching row are findings.
  • Pick one vendor pathway and request its most recent session log; if no log can be produced, the 'logged where' cell is fiction.
What looks done but is not
  • The inventory lists the official pathways while the machine builder's cellular modem, installed at commissioning, never appears on any list.
  • 'Time-bound' is recorded but never enforced — vendor accounts stay enabled between service calls because disabling them is friction.
  • The MSP's own administrative access is missing from the list, because the MSP compiled it.
Mapped relationships

Practices and requirements this artifact relates to

Brilliant at the Basics practices

NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2

NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3

Relationships are mapped support, not equivalence: completing this artifact documents work relevant to these requirements and does not by itself address any of them. Retention: Retain superseded inventories and the kill-list record; being able to show when a pathway was found and closed is evidence the review actually operates.

Full document

Preview — exactly what prints

INVENTORY · NETWORK & SEGMENTATIONv1.0 · REVIEWED 2026-08-06

Remote Access Pathway Inventory

Brilliant at the Basics Resource Center · brilliantatthebasics.us · published by inDirectIT, Inc.

Independent educational material. Not affiliated with, sponsored by, approved by, or endorsed by the U.S. Department of War. Does not establish compliance, certification, or contractual standing.

Purpose

Remote access is how most environments are actually entered — by employees, by vendors, and by attackers using either's credentials. This inventory makes every pathway visible and comparable: who uses it, how it authenticates, what brokers it, where its sessions land in a log, and whether it is standing or summoned. The pathways that fail those questions become the work plan; the ones nobody authorized become the kill list.

How to use it

Build the first draft from exported configurations and vendor contracts, then interview the people who actually connect — the honest answer to 'how does the vendor get in when the line is down at midnight?' is the row this inventory exists to capture. Review quarterly: pathways breed, and every new tool, vendor, or provider brings one. The inventory feeds the vendor risk assessment (ATL-028), which cites its rows.

Building the inventory

Enumeration sources — use all of them

  • Firewall rules permitting inbound traffic
    • Every inbound allow rule is a pathway or a leftover; both belong on a list.
  • VPN and gateway user lists
    • Export the actual account list — the difference between it and who should have access is a finding.
  • Installed remote-support tools
    • Software inventory scan for remote-desktop and remote-support agents, on office and plant machines alike.
  • Vendor and support contracts
    • Every support contract implies an access method; ask each vendor to describe theirs.
  • Interviews
    • Ask maintenance and engineering how they and their vendors really connect — including the way that 'only gets used when things are desperate'.

Pathway inventory

One row per distinct way in. A pathway with blanks in the authentication, logging, or time-bound columns is not documented — it is confessed.

Rows beginning EXAMPLE: show the expected shape — replace them with your own.

PathwayWho uses itAuthentication (MFA method)Brokered throughLogged whereTime-bound?Standing or on-demandOwnerAuthorized byLast reviewed
EXAMPLE: Company VPN (all staff)Employees on managed laptopsAuthenticator-app MFA at the gatewayVPN concentratorVPN and identity-provider logs, 12 months12-hour session limitOn-demandNetwork adminIT leader, 2025-112026-07-02
EXAMPLE: Machine builder support tunnel (packaging line)Vendor technicians (2 named)Vendor accounts + MFA on the jump hostOT jump host, enabled per ticketSession recording on the jump hostEnabled max 8 hours per ticketOn-demandOT / network adminPlant leader, 2026-012026-07-02
          
          
          
          

Kill list — unauthorized pathways

A pathway nobody authorized does not get retroactively blessed by being written down. It gets an owner, a removal date, and a verification — or a documented decision, properly authorized, to keep it under new rules.

Rows beginning EXAMPLE: show the expected shape — replace them with your own.

Pathway foundHow discoveredRisk while openDecisionRemoved / verified dateOwner
EXAMPLE: Consumer remote-desktop tool on the HMI workstationSoftware inventory scanUnbrokered internet path straight to productionRemove; vendor access moves to the jump hostRemoved 2026-06-20; verified by config reviewOT / network admin
      
      
      
Do not normalize the finding

The strong temptation is to add the discovered pathway to the inventory and move on. Resist it: the kill list preserves the distinction between access that was designed and access that merely happened, and the closed rows become your best evidence that the review works.

OT vendor access rules

No standing tunnels; sessions watched or recorded

Vendor access to production is brokered through a jump host you control, enabled per ticket, time-bound, and either watched live by your own staff or recorded — no standing tunnels, no vendor-owned modems, no shared always-on accounts. Apply the rule with the plant's reality in mind: cutting off a vendor mid-support-contract can strand you when the line is down, so schedule each pathway's conversion with the vendor and the process owner, keep an emergency-access procedure that is documented and logged rather than improvised, and test the new brokered path in a maintenance window before the old tunnel is closed.

Document control, version history, and approval

An artifact without an owner, a review date, and an approval trail is a snapshot, not a record. Complete this section before the document is used, and update it at every review.

FieldEntry
Document owner (named person) 
Suggested owner roleNetwork admin
Approval authorityIT leader
Review frequencyQuarterly, and at every new vendor, tool, or provider change
Next scheduled review 
Storage location of the completed document 
RetentionRetain superseded inventories and the kill-list record; being able to show when a pathway was found and closed is evidence the review actually operates.

Version history

VersionDateAuthorSummary of changeApproved by
     
     
     
     

Review and approval

Reviewed byRoleDateSignature / initials
    
    
Complete this offline — and mind what you write down

Fill this in inside your own environment, not on any public website or unapproved cloud tool. A completed copy may reveal your security posture: never include CUI, export-controlled data, credentials or keys, unremediated vulnerability details, network diagrams, or customer-sensitive information beyond what the artifact strictly needs, and store the completed document with the same care as the systems it describes.

Remote Access Pathway Inventory · version 1.0 · reviewed 2026-08-06 · file name batb-remote-access-pathway-inventory

Generated from the live artifact library at brilliantatthebasics.us/templates/remote-access-pathway-inventory. Independent educational material published by inDirectIT, Inc. Tailor every section to your technical, operational, contractual, regulatory, and safety requirements.